Suicide, the Choice to Live, and Values
Question: In Viable Values, Tara Smith expresses the view that things can only be objectively good or bad for someone who has adopted life as his final end. I wonder then, if one saw clearly what life would mean for oneself and decided that he didn't want that, would this mean that he could not rationally avoid things that he would find painful or displeasurable? For example, although if I decided I didn't want to live I could not possibly have anything which would be objectively GOOD for me, could other things nonetheless appear to me not to be bad, or to be avoided (such as avoiding a torturer, for example)?
Answer: There is a difference between what can appear to be good or bad for us over the short term or out of context, and what really is objectively good or bad for us in the full context.
Metaphysically, a life is an end-in-itself, because its continued existence depends on one's actions. Biologically, our abilities to feel that something is pleasurable or painful, or good or bad, evolved as capacities we need to survive. But we have free will: We are not required to act for the sake of our lives, nor even do what feels pleasurable. Indeed, we are not even required to act as we judge right. This is why we need ethics: Consistently acting for the sake of our own lives is not automatic nor easy. And because it is not automatic, it depends, at root, on a voluntary choice to live.
Sep 30, 2010
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